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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are scholars whose work is devoted 
to the study of constitutional rights. Having re-
searched the treatment of Second Amendment claims 
and claimants in the Courts of Appeals as compared 
to the treatment of those involving other fundamental 
rights, they are interested in ensuring that the Court 
has an accurate picture of the matter. 
A list of Amici and their respective academic posi-
tions is set forth in the Appendix.1  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In their effort to obtain a broad ruling on the Sec-
ond Amendment’s scope, Petitioners and their amici 
have sought to convince this Court that the Courts of 
Appeals have systematically relegated the Second 
Amendment to “second-class” status. The approach 
taken by Courts of Appeals to interpreting the Second 
Amendment, Petitioners contend, is “tantamount to 
imposing ‘a hierarchy of constitutional values’ by judi-
cial fiat.” Pet. Br. at 31 (quoting Valley Forge Chris-
tian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982)). Vari-
ous of their amici echo this sentiment.2 
 
1 All parties have filed a notice of blanket consent to the filing 
of amicus briefs with the Clerk. In accordance with Rule 37.6, no 
counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person 
other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
2 See Am. Civil Rights Union Br. at 2 (“This Court commands 
that the Second Amendment must not be treated as second-class 
constitutional right, but that is precisely what the Second Circuit 
here—and other circuits as well—have done.”); Bradley Byrne & 
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Petitioners and their supporters are incorrect. A 
fair review of ten years’ worth of decisions applying 
Heller and McDonald shows that the Courts of Ap-
peals have acted with fidelity to the Court’s instruc-
tions. To begin, the Courts of Appeals have applied a 
doctrinal framework that aligns not only with Heller 
and McDonald, but also with the constitutional frame-
work this Court has employed to review other funda-
mental rights. Next, an empirical analysis of Second 
Amendment challenges reveals a success rate that 
aligns closely to success rates for other challenges in-
volving fundamental rights. And finally, review of the 
cases Petitioners and their amici highlight in their ef-
fort to prove systemic judicial hostility reflect instead 
a judicial effort to grapple with the difficult issues pre-
sented—all consistent with this Court’s instructions. 
In other words, since Heller the Courts of Appeals 
have treated the Second Amendment as a fundamen-
tal right. 
 
119 Members of Congress Br. at 1 (action needed “to make clear 
that the fundamental right to keep and bear arms is not a second-
class right”); Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. at 2 (arguing Second 
Circuit applied “scrutiny beneath the dignity of a fundamental 
constitutional right” and that “(mis)treatment of the Second 
Amendment is common among lower courts”); Liberal Gun Club 
Br. at 4 (Courts of Appeals approach “incompatible with any in-
dividual right the Constitution protects”); Mtn. States Legal 
Foundation Br. at 25 (contending  Second Amendment has “sec-
ond-tier status” in lower courts); NRA Br. at 4 (“any lesser form 
of scrutiny [than strict scrutiny] would demote [the Second 
Amendment] to second-class status”); Profs. of Second Amend-
ment Law Br. at 2 (“lower courts have misused [a two-step test] 
to treat the Second Amendment as a second-class right”); George 
K. Young Br. at 6–7 (arguing that the “adequate alternatives” 
test used in some Circuit Court analyses of Second Amendment 
challenges would never be applied to other fundamental rights). 
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ARGUMENT 
In Heller, after confirming that the Second 
Amendment “conferred an individual right to keep 
and bear arms,” the Court declined to “clarify the en-
tire field,” leaving the task of constitutional interpre-
tation to the Courts of Appeals in the first instance. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 628-
29, 635 (2008). Since that ruling, the Courts of Ap-
peals have faithfully sought to carry out the Court’s 
mandate, reviewing the Second Amendment issues 
presented based on Heller’s instructions. There is no 
basis to conclude that the Courts of Appeals have 
elided this Court’s instructions or relegated the Sec-
ond Amendment to second-class status. As a result, 
there is also no reason for this Court now to accept 
Petitioners’ invitation to “clarify the entire field.” Id. 
This Court should continue to leave doctrinal develop-
ment to the Courts of Appeals in the first instance. 
I. The growing body of Second Amendment 
precedent has adhered to constitutional 
doctrine for reviewing fundamental rights. 
A. Strict scrutiny does not invariably gov-
ern fundamental-rights claims. 
To begin, the Court should reject the suggestion 
by several of Petitioners’ amici that the failure to ap-
ply strict scrutiny in every Second Amendment case 
demonstrates second-class treatment. The premise of 
this argument is that fundamental rights invariably 
merit strict scrutiny.3 That premise is untenable. 
 
3 See NRA Br. at 4 (“Because the Second Amendment is a fun-
damental, enumerated right, any lesser form of scrutiny [than 
strict scrutiny] would demote it to second-class status[.]”); Profs. 
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Strict scrutiny is not a universal feature of funda-
mental rights. Instead, this Court has subjected gov-
ernmental conduct to strict scrutiny only when it im-
plicates a limited set of rights—those found in the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech, Free Exercise, and 
Free Association Clauses, and in the Constitution’s 
guarantees of due process and equal protection—and, 
even then, it has done so only in limited cases.4 
Thus, the Court has applied a more relaxed stand-
ard of review in a number of cases involving these 
same rights. “Gradations of scrutiny” apply to the re-
view of the First Amendment right to free speech, de-
pending on the speaker, the type of speech, and the 
type of regulation. See Br. of Second Amendment Law 
Profs. at 15–17; see also pp. 8–9, below. Other exam-
ples abound. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
 
of 2d Amendment Law Br. at 5 (“[T]he refusal to apply strict scru-
tiny is striking.”); Bradley Byrne & 119 Members of Congress Br. 
at 6 (“Generally, a government action that burdens a fundamen-
tal right . . . is subject to strict scrutiny.”); Cato Inst. Br. at 4 (“It 
is . . . clear that an interest-balancing approach is usually inap-
propriate when it comes to . . . fundamental rights.”).  
4 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–20 (2017) (“laws that target the religious 
for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’” (quoting 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 
542 (1993))); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 
2207–08 (2016) (race-based classifications); Reed v. Town of Gil-
bert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (content-based regu-
lation of speech); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of 
Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 681 
(2010) (noting “the strict scrutiny [the Court has] applied in some 
settings to laws that burden expressive association”); see also 
Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 
46 Hastings Const. L. Q. 621, 641–42 (2019). 
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Clause, for instance, protects the fundamental right to 
practice one’s religion, but “neutral and generally ap-
plicable” laws receive reduced scrutiny even if they ob-
struct religious practices. See Trinity Lutheran 
Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2020–21 (discussing Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
and Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). Similarly, strict scrutiny some-
times applies to certain substantive due-process 
rights, but others are subject to lower standards of re-
view. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (“undue burden”).5   
Other rights do not trigger strict-scrutiny review 
at all—those found, for example, in the Fourth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments—but these rights are no less 
fundamental or “first-class.” Just this past Term, for 
example, the Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment’s protection against excessive fines is “funda-
mental,” Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 
(2019), but the test for whether fines are excessive 
does not require the narrowest tailoring between ends 
and means, see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 334 (1998) (punitive forfeiture unconstitutional 
only if “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a de-
fendant’s offense”).6 The short of it is that a failure to 
 
5 See also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2273 (2019) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“our precedents do not apply ‘strict 
scrutiny’ to race-based peremptory strikes”); Sessions v. Morales-
Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (applying only “heightened 
scrutiny” for “‘gender-based classifications’”). 
6 See also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010) 
(“This Court has ‘repeatedly refused to declare that only the least 
intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.’” (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
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apply strict scrutiny to firearms regulations could not 
show second-class status.  
B. The Courts of Appeals have adhered to 
fundamental-rights doctrine. 
Next, it is plain that the Courts of Appeals ad-
dressing Second Amendment challenges have applied 
doctrinal tests consistent with this Court’s prece-
dents. By and large, since Heller, the Courts of Ap-
peals have applied an approach similar to the “two-
step” framework the Second Circuit employed in this 
case, asking, first, “whether the challenged legislation 
impinges upon conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment” and second, “determining” “the appro-
priate level of scrutiny” based on the answer. N.Y. 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 
F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).7 This two-step approach accords with Heller 
and this Court’s fundamental-rights precedents. 
 
U.S. 646, 663 (1995))); Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) 
(Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated only where “coun-
sel’s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reason-
ableness” and the deficiency is “prejudicial to the defense” (quot-
ing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984))). 
7 For other Courts of Appeals applying the test, see, e.g., Gould 
v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678–80 (4th Cir. 2010); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 
700 F.3d 185, 193–94 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 
F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chovan, 735 
F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 
792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 
788 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Co-
lumbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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1. At the outset, it is plain that the Courts of Ap-
peals have adhered to Heller’s reasoning. In holding 
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right, Heller held that this right was “no different” 
from the First Amendment, while making clear it was 
“not unlimited.” 554 U.S. at 595, 635. The Court 
acknowledged that the government may impose “pro-
hibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill,” and that the individual right to bear 
arms was no obstacle to laws “forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places” or “imposing condi-
tions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.” Id. at 626–27. The Court also noted “another 
important limitation”—the Second Amendment pro-
tects only weapons “‘in common use.’” 554 U.S. at 627 
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 
(1939)). Thus, “weapons that are most useful in mili-
tary service—M–16 rifles and the like—may be 
banned.” Id. at 627. 
From these observations it follows that, when con-
fronting a Second Amendment challenge, the courts 
should ask questions like “whether the challenged leg-
islation impinges upon conduct protected by the Sec-
ond Amendment,” what sorts of constitutional inter-
ests does the legislation implicate, and how “sever[e]” 
is “the law’s burden on the right.” N.Y. State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 883 F.3d at 55–56 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). It is entirely unremarkable, 
therefore, that the Courts of Appeals have considered 
the constitutional interests at stake when addressing 
Second Amendment claims. 
2. Next, comparing the Courts’ of Appeals Second 
Amendment doctrine since Heller to this Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence shows that the Second 
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Amendment has been treated “no different[ly],” and 
indeed the doctrine has developed much like the way 
First Amendment doctrine historically developed. See 
Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Funda-
mental Right, 46 Hastings Const. L. Q. 621, 660–75 
(2019) (discussing doctrinal developments).  
A two-step, Second Amendment framework that 
considers the nature of the conduct in issue and its re-
lationship to the implicated constitutional principles 
conforms with well-established First Amendment doc-
trine. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716–
729 (2012) (plurality op.) (applying similar two-step 
inquiry to First Amendment challenge). Certain “ut-
terances,” the Court has held, “are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). As a result, 
some forms of speech receive little to no judicial pro-
tection. E.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 
(1978) (perjury); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) 
(fraud); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) 
(obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–
49 (1969) (“incitement to imminent lawless action”); 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per 
curiam) (true threats); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 573 
(1942) (“fighting words”).  
For other forms of speech, the level of scrutiny will 
vary with the constitutional interests implicated—
ranging from truthful political speech that is at the 
core of the First Amendment’s protections, e.g., Wil-
liams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. C.t 1656, 1662 (2015) 
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(judicial campaign speech), to speech that receives ju-
dicial solicitude, but as to which the government has 
more latitude, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–66 (1980) (com-
mercial speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504–14 (1969) (student speech).  
And even speech that is at the core of the First 
Amendment, this Court has held, may be subject to 
“reasonable” restrictions on the “time, place, [and] 
manner” of its exercise. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 789–90 (1989). Such regulation as well 
as incidental restrictions on core speech may be im-
posed without requiring the government to satisfy an-
ything approaching strict scrutiny. Id. (“[T]he Court 
of Appeals erred in requiring the city to prove that its 
regulation was the least intrusive means of furthering 
its legitimate governmental interests”); see also Clark 
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294–
99 (1984) (upholding restriction on camping in na-
tional parks as applied to protesters, whether viewed 
as time/place/manner restriction or incidental burden 
on expressive conduct). 
In sum, Petitioners and their amici may not like 
the flexible approach the Courts of Appeals have em-
ployed to review Second Amendment claims,8 but that 
 
8 Academics for the 2d Amendment Br. at 7 (“The practical 
effect of the dual standard of review is to allow lower courts to 
avoid any real application of the Second Amendment.”); Cato In-
stitute Br. at 2 (“The lack of a clear standard of review has ena-
bled—if not encouraged—the development of an unintelligible 
and wildly divergent body of law.”); Firearms Policy Foundation 
Br. at 10 (“[T]he lack of clear standards guiding and constraining 
the lower courts was happily noted by the court below, as precur-
sor to its dismantling of any meaningful protection of Second 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
flexibility is a hallmark of the doctrine informing this 
Court’s review of the very first of the individual rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. And in the Second 
Amendment context, it is also required by Heller’s pro-
nouncement that the Second Amendment is not un-
limited, that it does not protect all weapons, and that 
it specifically allows certain forms of regulation (like 
felon-in-possession statutes). In this respect, the Sec-
ond Amendment is no different from the First. 
II. Success rates of Second Amendment claims 
do not suggest second-class status. 
Certain amici have also stated that the second-
class status of the right to keep and bear arms may be 
inferred from the success rates of Second Amendment 
claims. See, e.g., Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. at 3–4 
 
Amendment Rights.”); Gun Owners Br. at 22 (“Sadly, most mod-
ern federal judges . . . . read into the Second Amendment the sub-
jective, flexible, judge-empowering word ‘unreasonably’ before 
‘infringed.’”); NRA Br. at 10 (“The problem is with the balancing 
inquiry itself—and the fact that the tiers-of-scrutiny framework 
by its very nature enables judges, who in many cases do not 
weigh the values at stake in the same way as the People who 
adopted the Second Amendment, to override the balance the Peo-
ple struck and substitute their own.”); Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n 
Br. at 4–5 (“two-step” approach “affords courts multiple opportu-
nities to tilt things in the government’s favor”); Commonwealth 
2d Amendment, Inc. Br. at 20 (“Reticence to examine the Second 
Amendment’s requirements, and the government’s consequent 
automatic victory, has now been fully absorbed into the two-step, 
means-ends scrutiny process.”); Gun Owners Br. at 7 (“‘[S]tep 
two’ was designed to provide a lawful-sounding cover to author-
ize Second Amendment violations that appeal to judges.”); Mtn. 
States Legal Foundation Br. at 12 (“[T]he two-step test is based 
on a fundamental misinterpretation of a single paragraph in Hel-
ler, has allowed courts to inappropriately narrow the scope of 
Second Amendment protected rights, and ignores this Court’s ex-
plicit prohibition of the use of interest-balancing tests[.]”). 
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(asserting that “essentially every iteration of Second 
Amendment challenge fail[s]” and that “only a few 
lower courts have struck a firearm restriction as un-
constitutional”); Commonwealth Second Amendment 
Br. at 5 (contending that “[n]otwithstanding the fact 
that the federal, state, and local governments compre-
hensively regulate every aspect of the possession and 
use of arms, decisions holding such regulations uncon-
stitutional are vanishingly rare”). An empirical review 
of lower court decisions tells a different story.  
The most comprehensive quantitative study of 
which we are aware concludes the data do not show 
second-class status. Professors Joseph Blocher of the 
Duke University School of Law and Eric Ruben of the 
SMU Dedman School of Law have analyzed every 
available Second Amendment case between the date 
Heller was decided and February 1, 2016—1,153 
claims in total, in state and federal court, at the trial 
and appellate level. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, 
From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke 
L.J. 1433, 1455 (2018). Ruben and Blocher show that 
the supposedly low success rate of Second Amendment 
claims “probably has more to do with the claims being 
asserted than with judicial hostility[.]” Id. at 1507.  
To begin, Ruben and Blocher demonstrate that 
merely tallying Second Amendment “wins” and 
“losses” results in an inaccurate picture. A majority of 
Second Amendment challenges—742 of the 1,153 they 
identified—were brought by criminal defendants 
whose counsel, they observe, reasonably “might be ex-
pected to raise any nonsanctionable defense.” Ruben 
& Blocher at 1507, see also id. at 1477–78. Indeed, 
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nearly half of those (or a quarter of all challenges) in-
volved felon-in-possession laws—a form of regulation 
Heller held was “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 1507; 
see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. 
The success rate in civil cases, by contrast, is sig-
nificantly higher, and it has steadily increased over 
time. Ruben & Blocher at 1486–90; see also id. at 
1507–08. Represented plaintiffs succeed more often 
than pro se plaintiffs, and the success rate for repre-
sented civil litigants at the federal appellate level is 
40 percent. See Ruben & Blocher at 1477–79, 1507–
1509. That is “well within the range of success rates 
for other constitutional claims,” and far from the in-
surmountable odds Petitioners’ amici seek to portray. 
Br. of Second Amendment Law Profs. at 22–23 (citing 
studies showing success rates for other rights ranging 
from 10 percent (regulatory takings), to roughly 12 to 
16 percent (Free Exercise), and 39 to 52 percent 
(Fourth Amendment)).9  
 
9 Amici Professors of Second Amendment Law cite two articles 
that criticize Ruben & Blocher’s methodology. See Profs. of Sec-
ond Amendment L. Br. at 32 (citing David Kopel, Data Indicate 
Second Amendment Underenforcement, 68 Duke L.J. Online 79 
(2018); George Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Distant 
Reading of Heller in the Courts, 68 Duke L.J. Online 41 (2018)). 
Both articles acknowledge that the success rate of Second 
Amendment cases is driven in part by weak claims, see Kopel at 
80; Mocsary at 43–44, and Mocsary acknowledges that claims 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny (a test he has criticized) have 
fared better than others, Mocsary at 44–45. Meanwhile, Kopel, 
who does not analyze enforcement data in the context of other 
rights, appears to assume that the Second Amendment is being 
“underenforced” simply because he disagrees with certain deci-
sions, including Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2019). See Ko-
pel at 88.   
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What’s more, “Second Amendment claims have 
had relatively high success rates in the courts that 
have been criticized as giving the Second Amendment 
right second-class treatment,” including by amici sup-
porting Petitioners here. Ruben & Blocher at 1475; see 
also id. at 1505. In both relative and absolute terms, 
Second Amendment challenges have fared best in the 
Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. Id. 
at 1475; compare Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. at 2 
(“the Second Circuit’s (mis)treatment of the Second 
Amendment is common among lower courts” and the 
Ninth Circuit is “perhaps the worst offender”). 
For all these reasons, the Court should reject 
amici’s assertion that litigation success rates demon-
strate a systematic bias against Second Amendment 
claims. 
III. The Court should not credit conjecture 
about judicial “hostility”. 
Finally, the Court should discount the notion, ad-
vanced by certain amici, that a review of cherry-
picked cases chosen by them reflects judicial “bias” or 
“hostility.”10 As just stated, a review of the doctrine 
 
10 See Commonwealth Second Amendment Br. at 4 (urging 
Court to “address the lower courts’ bias against the Second 
Amendment”); Firearms Policy Found. Br. at 2 (“[i]t is no secret 
that many federal courts . . . have been hostile to the point of 
contempt toward claims under the Second amendment”); Gun 
Owners of Am. Br. at 4 (asking Court to “put a stop to the open 
anti-gun prejudice of many lower court judges, quell the open re-
bellion in the lower courts, [and] admonish their near-universal 
rejection” of Heller and McDonald); Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. 
at 5–6 (claiming “the lengths to which courts have reached [to 
find that challenged laws do not burden the Second Amendment] 
confirms Amici’s suspicion of bias in employing the test); Liberal 
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applied by the Courts of Appeals shows conformity 
with the approach taken toward evaluating other fun-
damental rights, and litigation success rates are 
roughly in line. Meanwhile, amici’s anecdotal evi-
dence fares no better in establishing their thesis. 
California Rifle & Pistol Association and their co-
amici, for example, cite the Third Circuit’s decision to 
uphold New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement 
for a handgun carry license as evidence of bias. Br. at 
6 (discussing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 
2013)). In that case, they assert, the court supposedly 
showed bias when it “pointed out that the list [of law-
ful restrictions in Heller] is not ‘exhaustive’ and that 
being 90-years-old qualified the requirement for inclu-
sion.” Br. at 6. But, in fact, the Third Circuit engaged 
in an extensive discussion of the history of New Jer-
sey’s regulation—as well as those in other jurisdic-
tions—before concluding it was the type of “presump-
tively lawful” regulation Heller identified. 724 F.3d at 
431–34. That mode of analysis is consistent with Hel-
ler, which stated that the scope of the Second Amend-
ment should be determined by reference to historic 
regulations. See Heller 554 U.S. at 626–27; see also 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010); 
id. at 802 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that “tra-
ditional restrictions go to show the scope of the right, 
not its lack of fundamental character”). 
 
Gun Club Br. at 18 (describing lower courts’ rulings as a “delib-
erate attempt to subject the protections of the Second Amend-
ment to a death by a thousand cuts”); NRA Br. at 29 (“Judges 
who think that Second Amendment’s ‘scope too broad’ have de-
termined ‘on a case-by-case basis’ that in most every case that 
the Second Amendment right is not ‘really worth insisting upon.’” 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634)). 
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Amici also point to the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
holding that Maryland’s assault-weapons ban is con-
stitutional because the affected weapons are “‘like’ the 
M-16 machine gun,” supposedly “ignor[ing] that the 
rifles are lawfully owned by millions of civilians in this 
country.” Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. 6–7, (discussing 
Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017)). Here again, no bias 
is apparent. Instead, the en banc Fourth Circuit ana-
lyzed substantial record evidence that AR-15 pattern 
rifles and other weapons banned by Maryland were, 
in their design characteristics, sufficiently “like” M–
16 rifles to fall within the scope of Heller’s express 
guidance that “weapons . . . most useful in military 
service” may be proscribed. See 849 F.3d at 124–29, 
135–37, 141–44; see also Heller v. District of Colum-
bia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Heller II”) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“when legislatures seek 
to address new weapons that have not traditionally 
existed or to impose new gun regulations because of 
conditions that have not traditionally existed . . . [it] 
does [not] mean that the government is powerless[.] 
. . . [T]he proper interpretive approach is to reason by 
analogy from history and tradition”).11 
Both California Rifle & Pistol Association and 
Commonwealth Second Amendment amici also attack 
as “sleight of hand” or “moving the goal posts” the 
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Teixeira that a county 
zoning ordinance restricting the location of gun stores 
did not burden conduct falling within the Second 
 
11 As noted above, amici accuse the Fourth Circuit of “ignoring” 
the widespread ownership of the types of firearm at issue, but, in 
fact, the court addressed this point several times. See Kolbe, 849 
F.3d at 135–36, 137 n. 11, 141–42.  
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Amendment’s scope. Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Br. 8–9 
(discussing Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670 
(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 
(2019)); see also Commonwealth Second Amendment 
Br. at 18–19. Here again, a review of the court’s deci-
sion reveals no sleight of hand. Instead, the Ninth Cir-
cuit sitting en banc conducted a seven-page analysis 
of the text and history of the Second Amendment be-
fore concluding it does not “independently protect a 
proprietor’s right to sell firearms.” 873 F.3d at 690, see 
also id. at 681–689. Contrary to amici, Teixeira does 
not remotely suggest the court would have upheld a 
law “prohibiting gun stores altogether.”12 
With no actual proof of systemic bias, amici next 
point to passing judicial remarks as evidence of sup-
posed bias. They quote, for example, the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s comment that “[t]his is serious business” and 
“[w]e do not wish to be even minutely responsible for 
some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in 
the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalcu-
lated[.]” Commonwealth Second Amendment Br. at 7 
(quoting U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th 
Cir. 2011).13 But this sort of statement does not betray 
hostility either. Heller and McDonald do not require 
 
12 Indeed, before analyzing the appellants’ claim of a right to 
sell firearms, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Second 
Amendment rights of prospective purchasers were burdened, see 
Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 677–78 (agreeing that the right to keep and 
bear arms necessarily includes the right to acquire them), and 
concluded there would be no plausible impact, because another 
store selling firearms was just 600 feet away, id. at 678–81. 
13 See also id. at 7–8 (criticizing other judicial comments); 
Profs. of Second Amendment Law Br. at 28–30 (similarly accus-
ing lower courts of relying on public safety concerns when afford-
ing the Second Amendment second-class treatment). 
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the courts to ignore the consequences of their deci-
sions or the safety justifications governments may in-
terpose to support regulation. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626–27 (the prohibition against the carrying of “dan-
gerous and unusual weapons” is an “important limit” 
on Second Amendment rights); cf. Heller II 670 F.3d 
at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (remarking that 
“D.C.’s public safety motivation in enacting these laws 
is worthy of great respect”). Again, First Amendment 
doctrine shows that is so; courts have long considered 
public safety and welfare in evaluating the scope of 
constitutional protections for free speech. E.g., Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
In short, far from demonstrating a pattern of judi-
cial “hostility,” many of the cases amici identify show 
an effort to grapple with difficult questions, with fidel-
ity to this Court’s guidance in Heller and McDonald. 
The Second Amendment analysis that this Court in-
structed the Courts of Appeals to conduct calls for the 
exercise of “nuanced judgments,” see McDonald, 561 
U.S. at 803–04 (Scalia, J., concurring), and the avail-
able materials do not always point in the same direc-
tion.14 That is what the cases show. They do not re-
motely evidence bias, let alone on a systemic basis. 
 
14 See also Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing) (“[t]o be sure, analyzing the history and tradition of gun laws 
in the United States does not always yield easy answers”); Ka-
chalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“History and tradition do not speak with one voice here.”); 
Drake, 724 F.3d at 430–31 (historical evidence relating to li-
censes to carry firearms points in multiple directions). 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no substance to the argument that the 
Second Amendment is systematically receiving “sec-
ond-class” treatment, and, indeed, an analysis of the 
doctrine the Courts of Appeals have applied, and of 
the results of Second Amendment cases, tends to show 
the opposite. Review of the supposedly hostile cases 
Petitioners and their amici cite as anecdotal proof, 
meanwhile, demonstrates an effort to adhere to this 
Court’s instructions and to develop the doctrine in the 
way the Court instructed in Heller and McDonald. 
There is, in short, neither occasion nor justification for 
the Court to codify an unvarying standard of strict re-
view for the Second Amendment. No such standard 
governs any other fundamental right. And the Courts 
of Appeals should continue to develop the doctrine as 
they have, case by case, in the way Heller envisioned. 
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